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ALLOCATION OF THE RISK OF LOSS IN THE
TRANSPORTATION OF FREIGHT-THE
FUNCTION OF INSURANCE
SAUL SORKIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
IT has been estimated by the Select Committee on Small Business of the
United States Senate Commerce Committee that pilferage, vandalism
and hijacking have resulted in property losses of 1.2 billion dollars a
year,1 exclusive of losses resulting from other causes. However, the lack
of a uniform standard of liability precludes a rational system of allocating
the risk of these losses.
For instance, numerous factors affect the ability of a shipper to recover
compensation from a carrier for loss or damage to goods. One such factor
is the mode of transportation involved in the carriage, i.e., whether it is a
shipment by rail or truck, a shipment by ocean carrier, or a shipment by
air. The laws concerning carrier liability have developed independently
for air carriers, carriers of goods by sea, and overland carriers, resulting
in a significant variation among the different modes of transportation in
both the allowable exemptions from liability and the limitations of liabil-
ity applicable to each mode of transportation.
When a particular shipment is involved in more than one mode of
transportation, the exemptions from liability and limitations upon the
liability of the carrier may vary as the shipment is transferred. For ex-
ample, if the shipment was moved initially by truck and then was trans-
ferred to an air carrier, the liability of the carrier would change from a
high standard to a limited standard.
In recent years there has been a continuing trend toward the use of
containerized freight. A shipper may load a trailer-sized container with
freight in good condition, seal the container, and deliver it to a trucker
for transportation. During the trip the container may be transferred to
rail carriers which carry the container piggy-back on top of flat cars.
It may then be transferred to an ocean carrier for carriage to a foreign
port. Ultimately the container is delivered to its destination and opened
for the first time since the shipper parted with possession. If upon open-
ing the container the freight is discovered to be damaged, the determi-
nation of which carrier is liable and the extent of the carrier's liability
may present a formidable problem.
* Member of the New York Bar; A.B., Brooklyn College, LL.B., Harvard University.
Mr. Sorkin is a Partner in the New York firm of Sorkin & Berger.
1. 164 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 30, 1970, at 1, coL 4.
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The technological advances in the transportation industry and the in-
creased trend toward combining the different modes of transportation
into a unified transportation system create problems with regard to
the relevant standards of liability. Should there be one standard of liabil-
ity for all carriers-land, sea, air, domestic and foreign-and what should
that standard be? What problems do the carriers and shippers face?
What are the economic factors and the equities to be considered?
In most commercial shipments insurance is involved in relation to the
risk of loss or damage. Insurance against such risks is generally carried
by the shippers. Liability insurance for risk of loss or damage to cargo
is also generally carried by the carriers, sometimes because such insur-
ance is required by statute2 and sometimes solely as a matter of prudent
business practice. In the United States carriers have for over a century
attempted to exempt themselves from liability or limit their liability to
the extent of the amount that a shipper has been compensated for his loss
by the shipper's insurance carrier. The carriers have attempted this by
inserting in their bills of lading a provision giving the carrier the benefit
of insurance effected upon the shipment." This benefit of insurance pro-
vision has been and continues to be the subject of substantial litigation.
This article will examine the standards of liability, the problems created
for the carrier and shipper by the myriad rules of liability, the nature of
the controversy concerning the benefit of insurance clauses in the bills of
lading, and the function insurance should play in the allocation of the
ultimate burden of risk of loss or damage-all with the hope that such an
examination of the problem will lead to a uniform, functional and eco-
nomic method of allocating the risk of loss and damage.
II. THE LIABILITY OF OVERLAND CAuIERS
A. Common Law
At common law a carrier was regarded as an insurer. The carrier was
liable for goods stolen from him or lost from his charge except where the
loss resulted from an act of God or the public enemy. The common
law, in imposing liability, dispensed with the necessity of a shipper prov-
ing that damage to a shipment was caused by the negligence of the
carrier.5 The justification for making the common carrier an insurer has
been said to be to prevent negligence or collusion between dishonest car-
riers and thieves to the prejudice of the shipper, since geographic remote-
2. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 315 (1964).
3. See text accompanying notes 100-58 infra.
4. 0. Holmes, The Common Law 180 (1881).
5. Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 350 U.S. 162, 173 (1956) (concurring
opinion).
[Vol. 40
ALLOCATION OF RISK OF LOSS
ness of the shipper from the property while it was in transit would make
proof of such collusion difficult, if not impossible.' To reduce the effective-
ness of this harsh doctrine of liability, the carriers provided in their con-
tracts for an exemption from liability or for the limitation of liability to
an agreed value. In some instances the carriers attempted thereby to
exempt themselves from liability for their own negligence.
Prior to the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act7 the validity of
such agreements depended upon state law. However, the law then applied
by the Supreme Court of the United States was that a common carrier
could, by contract, limit his common-law liability but could not by agree-
ment exempt himself from liability for his own negligence." The test
applied by the Supreme Court to limitations upon the common law liabil-
ity of a carrier was whether the limitation was just and reasonable.' A
common carrier, in the absence of fraud or special contract, was liable
for loss even if he was ignorant of the contents of the package and regard-
less of its value."0 But if a special agreement was made between the
shipper and carrier which limited the liability of a carrier to an "agreed
valuation" and the freight rate varied with the valuation, then in the
event of loss, the shipper was limited in his recovery to the agreed value
since the limitation was deemed just and reasonable." The rationale be-
hind this theory was that it would be unjust to allow a shipper to be paid
a large sum after a loss occurred if he had induced the carrier to accept a
lower freight rate by claiming before the loss that the goods were worth
less. Furthermore, the rule was held not to induce a lack of care by the
carrier since the carrier could provide protection in accordance with the
disclosed value.'
In 1887 Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act to regulate
transportation. 3 The Act as originally adopted contained no provision
concerning the liability of carriers for loss or damage to goods, and no
provision prohibiting carriers from exempting themselves from or limiting
their liability by agreement in the bill of lading or otherwise. Conse-
quently, the validity of conditions limiting a carrier's liability in bills of
lading used in interstate commerce continued to be determined by state
law. Many states, either by statute or by rule of law, did not permit car-
6. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R. v. Collins Produce Co., 249 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1919).
7. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
8. Hart v.Pennsylvania R.R., 112 US. 331, 338 (1884).
9. Id. at 338-39.
10. Id. at 340.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379.
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riers to limit their liability. In Pennsylvania Railroad v. Hughes,14 the
Supreme Court held that in the absence of congressional legislation a
state had the right to require a common carrier to be liable for the full
value of goods which were lost or damaged despite the existence of a
special contract limiting the carrier's liability to a stated amount or agreed
value. It has been said that it was the rule enunciated in this case which
led to the enactment of the Carmack Amendment."5
B. The Carmack Amendment
In 1906 Congress passed the Hepburn Act. 6 For the first time carriers
receiving goods for transportation from a point in one state to a point in
another state were required to issue a bill of lading. The receiving carrier
was made liable for any loss or damage caused by it or by any connecting
carrier to which the property might be delivered. All exemptions from
liability by contract or rule were prohibited. The liability provision was
popularly known as the Carmack Amendment.
In 1915 the Interstate Commerce Act was further amended by the
Cummins Amendment" which made the carrier liable for the "full actual
loss or damage or injury" to property. While the act continued to make
unlawful and void any limitation of liability contained in the bill of lading,
receipt, rule, or regulation, it added a proviso for goods hidden from
view by wrapping, boxing or other means whereby the carrier was not
notified as to the character of the goods.' In such instance, the carrier
was authorized to require the shipper to specifically state the value of
the goods. Thereupon the carrier was relieved from liability beyond the
amount specifically stated by the shipper, often called the released value.
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was authorized to estab-
lish freight rates based on such values. In 1916 the Interstate Commerce
Act was further amended by the Second Cummins Amendment 9 which
required that rates dependent on the value of the property shipped be
filed as part of the tariff filed by the carrier with the ICC. If, in the
opinion of the Commission, such released rates were just and reasonable
the Commission could, by its order, authorize the rate.
14. 191 U.S. 477 (1903).
15. C. Miller, Interstate Commerce Commission Law and Procedure 344 (1939). For a
partial history of the Interstate Commerce Act see C. Miller, The Legislative Evolution of the
Interstate Commerce Act (1930).
16. Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584.
17. Act of Mar. 4, 1915, ch. 176, 38 Stat. 1196.
18. The Hepburn Act had overlooked this vital problem. Prior to 1906 carriers could limit
their liability in the bill of lading to a fixed amount unless the shipper stated the value of
the goods and paid an extra charge.
19. Act of Aug. 9, 1916, ch. 301, 39 Stat. 441.
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Today, except for limited exclusions permitted by statute and com-
mon law, carriers receiving or delivering property and subject to the
provisions of the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act"
-railroads, motor carriers, freight forwarders, and express companies-
are
liable to the lawful holder of . . . [a] bill of lading . . . for the full actual loss,
damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any such common carrier, rail-
road, or transportation company to which such property may be delivered or over
whose line or lines such property may pass within the United States or within an
adjacent foreign country when transported on a through bill of lading, notwithstanding
any limitation of liability or limitation of the amount of recovery or representation
or agreement as to value in any such receipt or bill of lading, or in any contract, rule,
regulation, or in any tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission; and any
such limitation, without respect to the manner or form in which it is sought to be
made is declared to be unlawful and void....21
However, the carrier can limit its liability if the carrier and shipper have
agreed upon a released rate and that rate has been approved by the
ICC as part of the carrier's tariff.22 The exception for released value is
no longer limited to goods hidden from view.23
The contract between the shipper and the overland carrier-the bill of
lading-generally also provides that the carrier shall not be liable for
loss or damage caused by an act of God, the public enemy, authority of
law, an act or default of the shipper or owner, natural shrinkage, or
losses resulting from a defect or vice in the property shipped.2 4 Thus,
although subjected to a high standard of care by statute and the com-
mon law, an overland carrier is not liable for every loss from any and
every cause.25
To establish the prima facie liability of either the receiving or deliver-
ing carrier, the shipper in most instances need prove only that the ship-
ment was delivered in good condition to the initial carrier and was either
not delivered, delivered short or delivered damaged." The initial and
delivering carriers are liable although they may be in no way responsible
for the loss or damage, as in those instances where the loss or damage
occurs on the line of an intermediate connecting carrier.
20. The Canrmack Amendment is expressly applicable to motor carriers and freight for-
warders. 49 U.S.C. §§ 319, 1013 (1964).
21. Id. § 20(11).
22. Id. There can be a limitation on property "received for transportation concerning
which the carrier shall have been or shall be expressly authorized or required by order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission to establish and maintain rates dependent upon the value
declared in writing by the shipper... 2' Id.
23. See note 18 supra and accompanying tet.L
24. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137 (1964).
25. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 506 (1913).
26. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 138 (1964).
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In many instances a carrier will accept goods for shipment in a sealed
or closed package or container. The realities of the transportation of
freight do not permit a carrier to inspect the contents of each shipment
before accepting it for transportation. Usually such shipments are de-
livered to the consignee in the original packages or containers with no
exterior visible evidence of damage. When these packages or containers
are opened by the consignee, the contents may be in a damaged condition.
There is no way, short of inspection of the contents of each shipment,
for a carrier to determine whether the goods were in fact in good condi-
tion when packed by the shipper or, if the damage is discovered some-
time after delivery, whether the damage occurred between the time of
delivery to the consignee and the time of discovery. Although it may be
more difficult for a shipper to make out a prima facie case against a
carrier in concealed loss or damage cases, the area remains one where
the carrier can be at the mercy of a fraudulent claimant.
Thus, as between the shipper and the carrier, the burden of the risk of
loss has been placed on the carrier who has undertaken to carry the goods
for compensation. Although carriers may not be liable for loss or damage
in every circumstance, the areas of liability without probable fault are
extensive and go beyond theft, pilferage and hijackings.
C. The Special Problem of Articles of Extraordinary Value
Section 5 of both the motor carrier and freight forwarder bills of lading
provides that no carrier will carry or be liable in any way for any docu-
ments, specie or any articles of extraordinary value not specifically rated
in the tariffs unless there is a special agreement made by the carrier and
a stipulated value endorsed on the agreement. 7
If the goods being shipped are fraudulently misdescribed by a shipper,
such as the shipment of a package of diamonds described on the bill of
lading and carton as candy gum balls, the courts would generally not
permit recovery against the carrier28 The problem with the "extraordi-
nary value" liability exclusion is two-fold. First, railroads, 0 motor car-
riers3" and freight forwarders3' may charge for the transportation of
property only those rates which have been published by the carrier in its
tariff filed with the ICC. These rates are subject to the Commission's
approval and must be just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory. Advance
notice of the filing of the tariffs must be given and the tariffs and rates
are subject to investigation, protest and suspension.
27. See Contract Terms & Conditions of Uniform Order & Straight Bill of Lading § S.
28. E.g., Southern Express Co. v. Wood, 98 Ga. 268, 25 S.E. 436 (1896); see Annot.,
1 A.L.R,3d 736 (1965).
29. 49 U.S.C. § 6 (1964).
30. Id. §§ 317-18.
31. Id. §§ 1005-06.
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While the classifications are required to be reasonable, rates are estab-
lished for categories of property which often do not take cognizance of
all items and their variations in value within a specific category. The
examination of a typical tariff and classification of a carrier will show
that the carrier has attempted to list separately all of the different types
of items within a particular category. Thus, if there were a category for
hair, there might be separate rate items for cattle hair, rabbit hair, human
hair, etc. However, a carrier cannot carry an item for which there is no
rate established. Consequently, for each category there will generally be
a catch-all classification and rating usually followed by the letters "NOI"
or "NOIBN" which indicates that the goods are "not otherwise indexed"
or "not otherwise indexed by name." If the shipment is rated for the catch-
all classification as NOI or NOIBN, then there is a "specific" rate in the
tariff for the item carried and it is not excluded under section 5.
Thus, in Salon Service, Inc. v. Pacific & Atlantic Shippers, Inc.' the
tariff of the defendant freight forwarders contained a rate for "Hair
goods, human or imitation hair, NOIBN, in boxes." There was no spe-
cific rate for "wigs."33 The carrier's cost of shipping 12 cartons of human
hair weighing 130 pounds may not have varied significantly from the
cost of a shipment of 12 cartons of human hair wigs weighing 130 pounds,
but the risk or loss or damage incurred by the carrier was significantly
different. Thus the carrier accepted a shipment of 12 cartons of wigs at
a transportation charge of $7.221- and thereby subjected itself to a poten-
tial liability of $23,100.00 for the alleged value of the shipment which
subsequently disappeared. When such a risk factor is added to the general
difficulty of handling small shipments profitably, it compounds the prob-
lem of solving the needs of shippers of small shipments and constitutes
an additional consideration militating against the imposition of liability
upon the carrier.35 The carrier does not always receive sufficient con-
sideration to enable him to profitably assume the risk of loss or damage.
The second problem arises where the carrier knows what the freight is
but does not know the value, i.e., where there has been no fraudulent
misdescription. In such instances some courts have held that the exclu-
sion is void under the Carmack Amendment, which makes any limitation
of liability in any contract or tariff void unless there is a reduced rate
32. 30 App. Div. 2d 190, 291 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1st Dep't 1968), atPd, 24 N.Y2d 15, 246
NE.2d 509, 294 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1969).
33. Record at 68, Salon Serv., Inc. v. Pacific & AtL Shippers, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 15, 246
N.E.2d 509, 298 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1969).
34. Id. at 73.
35. Carriers can be forced to become artful dodgers of unprofitable freight. Truders, for
example, generally lose money on the transportation of small packages. Transportation Needs
a Drastic Overhaul, Bus. Week, Nov. 14, 1970, at 72, col. 2.
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order filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and a choice of
rates given to the shipper. 6
III. THE EFFECT OF Am, SEA, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERmODAL
TRANSPORTATION ON THE ALLOCATION OF RISK OF Loss
AND DAMAGE
The problem of determining who should bear the risk of loss or damage
to property during the course of its transportation has been aggravated
by the use of containers and international intermodal transportation, and
will be rendered more complex by the increasing use of the through bill
of lading. The means of transportation may involve one or more of the
following: motor carriers, rail carriers, water carriers, air carriers,
carriers of goods by sea, and freight forwarders. Each may be involved
with the risk of loss. The extent to which the shipper will bear the risk
of loss or damage presently is dependent upon the exemption from or
limitation of liability applicable to a particular type of carrier. The right
of a carrier, who is compelled to compensate a shipper for loss or damage,
to recoup the amount paid from another carrier on whose line the loss
occurred may be limited by similar factors.
A. Liability of Air Carriers
Pursuant to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the tariffs of air car-
riers are subject to the regulation of the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB), 3 7 the functions of which have now been transferred to the De-
partment of Transportation 8 The CAB can properly accept tariffs con-
taining rules exempting the airline from liability for loss or damage to
specified property caused by a carrier regardless of fault, or tariffs limit-
ing liability to a specified sum in the absence of a declaration of a higher
value by the shipper and the concomitant payment of a higher charge.""
In Tishman & Lipp, Inc. v. Delta Air Lines,40 a passenger on a flight
from New Orleans to New York shipped a sample case of jewelry as air
freight rather than excess baggage. The passenger had not declared the
36. E.g., Thomas Electronics, Inc. v. H.W. Taynton Co., 277 F. Supp. 639 (M.D. Pa.
1967); Railway Express Agency v. Hueber, 191 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945). Contra,
Hecker Prods. Corp. v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 296 Mich. 381, 296 N.W. 297
(1941). Where the Carmack Amendment is not applicable, e.g., shipments handled by air
carriers or water carriers, a limitation of liability is effective.
37. 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1964).
38. Id. § 1655(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
39. Vogelsang v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 302 F.2d 709, 712-13 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 826 (1962); Bruce Glen, Inc. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 24 App. Div. 2d 145, 264
N.Y.S.2d 876 (1st Dep't 1965).
40. 413 F.2d 1401 (2d Cir. 1969).
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value on the airbill. Upon arrival in New York, one section of the sample
case containing jewelry valued at $50,000 was missing. Delta's tariff
provided that its liability would be limited to $50 on jewelry unless the
jewelry were specifically described on the airbill and an additional trans-
portation charge paid. The shipper's recovery was limited to $50. The
failure of the plaintiff to put the air carrier on notice of the contents of
the baggage was found by the court to have deprived the carrier of the
opportunity to take extra precautions for its safety, thereby justifying
the imposition of the loss upon the shipper who "chose to take the
chance."'
The liability of air carriers for loss or damage to property involved in
international transportation is limited by the Warsaw Convention, to
which the United States has been a party since 1934.I The Convention,
which has been approved by over 90 countries, provides that it is applic-
able to transportation where the place of departure and the place of
destination are situated either within the territories of two contracting
parties or within the territory of one contracting party if there is a stop-
ping place subject to the sovereignty of another power, even if such other
power is not a party to the convention4 3 The Convention provides that
the carrier shall be liable for loss or damage to goods if the occurrence
which caused the damage took place during the transportation by air.'
The period of air transportation includes the period during which the
goods are in the care of the carrier whether in an airport, on board a
plane, or, in case of a landing other than at an airport, anywhere.'
The international air carrier is exempted from liability if it proves that
all steps necessary to avoid the damage were taken or that it was im-
possible to take such measures;46 if such steps were taken but the damage
was occasioned by an error in piloting, handling of the aircraft or navi-
gation; 4 or if it proves that the damage is a result of contributory negli-
gence, provided the doctrine is recognized in the forum in which the
action is pending.48 If the international air carrier is liable at all for
damage to goods, its liability is limited to approximately $7.50 per pound
41. Id. at 1407.
42. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transporta-
tion by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934), TS. No. 876 (effective June 27, 1934) [here-
inafter cited as Warsaw Convention); see Note, Legal and Regulatory Aspects of the Con-
tainer Revolution, 57 Geo. LJ. 533, 549 (1969); Note, Transporting Goods by Air, 69
Yale L.J. 993 (1960).
43. Warsaw Convention, art. 1(2).
44. Id., art. 18(1).
45. Id., art. 18(2).
46. Id., art. 20().
47. Id., art. 20(2).
48. Id., art. 21.
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unless the consignor, at the time the package is delivered to the carrier,
has made a declaration of value and paid a supplementary sum, if re-
quired, in which case the carrier is liable for the actual value or the
declared sum, whichever is less.49 An international air carrier cannot ob-
tain the benefits of the Convention if the damage is caused by the willful
misconduct of the carrier or its authorized agent acting within the scope
of his employment."°
If land or water transportation takes place in the performance of a
contract for transportation by air, then for purposes of loading, delivery
or transshipment, there is a rebuttable presumption that any damage to
the goods took place during the transportation by air."1 This can be an
area of conflict if the land transportation involved is by a carrier subject
to the Carmack Amendment. Thus, in Pick v. Lufthansa German Air-
lines, 5 2 an air waybill bearing the letters "W.C.L." (meaning Warsaw
Convention Limitation) had been issued to the shipper prior to the loss
of the goods on the ground en route to the airport. The shipper's recovery
was held to be limited by the agreement contained in the air waybill to the
amount set forth in the Warsaw Convention.
B. Liability of Carriers of Goods by Sea
Limitations of carrier liability for property loss are maximized in the
case of carriers by sea. Shipowners are exempt from liability for loss or
damage to precious cargo unless the true character and description are
described in the bill of lading, and even then they are not liable beyond
the value declared. They are further exempt from property loss or
damage resulting from fire, unless caused by their design or neglect.5 4
In any event, a shipowner's liability is limited to the value of his interest
in the vessel and its freight then pending.55 Under the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act (COGSA), "6 neither the carrier nor the ship are responsible
for loss or damage resulting from neglect or default of the carrier in navi-
gation or management of the ship; perils, damages and accidents of the
sea or navigable waters; acts of God, war, or public enemies; quarantine;
acts or omissions of the shipper or owner of goods; strikes or lockouts;
49. The convention states that the liability of the carrier shall not exceed 250 francs par
kilogram based on the gold franc described in the convention. Id., art. 22.
50. Id., art. 25.
51. Id., art. 18(3).
52. 48 Misc. 2d 442, 265 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Civ. Ct. 1965). See also Twentieth Century Deliv.
Serv., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 242 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1957).
53. 46 U.S.C. § 181 (1964).
54. Id. §§ 182, 1304(2) (b).
55. Id. § 183(a).
56. Id. §§ 1300-15.
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riots or civil commotions; saving or attempting to save life or property at
sea; inherent defect, quality, or vice in the goods; insufficiency of pack-
ing or marks; latent defects; and any other cause arising without actual
fault and privity of the carrier.5
7
The Carriage of Goods by Sea Act was drawn almost verbatim from
the Hague Rules of 1921,18 as amended by the Brussels Convention of
1924,' 9 the purposes of which was to establish uniform ocean bills of
lading to govern the rights and liabilities of carriers and shippers intcr se
in international trade."0 COGSA further provides that neither the carrier
nor the ship shall in any event be liable for any loss or damage to goods
in excess of $500 per package or, if the goods are not shipped in pack-
ages, per customary unit.6 The technological revolution in transportation,
including the use of containers and other forms of packaging, has created
substantial controversy concerning the definition of a "package" or "cus-
tomary freight unit."
In Standard Electrica, S.A. v. Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschif-
ffalrts-Gesellshaft,62 the shipment consisted of nine "pallets." Each pallet
contained six cardboard cartons with 40 television tuners in each carton.
The pallets had a wooden base and a wooden deck on top and were bound
with metal strips. Seven of the nine pallets were never delivered. The
shipper had not declared the value of the shipment or paid an extra
charge. The issue was whether the $500 per package limitation in COGSA
should be applied to each of the seven missing pallets for a maximum
liability of $3,500 or to the 54 missing cartons for a maximum liability of
$41,000. The court held that the package was the "pallet" rather than each
carton on the pallet and that if the $500 per package limit was inequitable
or inadequate because of the passage of time it was the function of Con-
gress to change it, not the courts. The court pointed out that larger
container ships were being built to accommodate such special cargo,
giving rise to exciting possibilities such as the loading of vessels from in-
land ports by sky-crane helicopters. The court, referring to the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act, stated:
Few, if any, in 1936 could have foreseen the change in the optimum size of shipping
57. Id. § 1304(2).
58. See A. Knauth, The American Law of Ocean Bills of Lading 125-26, 163 (4th ed.
1953).
59. International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of
Lading, Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233 (1937), T.S. No. 931 (effective May 26, 1937).
60. Robert C. Herd & Co. v. Krawill Mach. Corp, 359 US. 297, 301 (1959) ; G. Gilmore
& C. Black, Admiralty § 3-24 (1957).
61. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1964).
62. 375 F.2d 943 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 US. 831 (1967).
63. Id. at 946-47.
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units that has arisen as the result of technological advances in the transportation in-
dustry. As both parties recognize, it is now common for carriers to receive cargo
from their shippers in a palletized form or "containerized" form. In some instances an
entire trailer may be uncoupled from its tractor-truck on the pier and placed aboard
the carrier. With [two exceptions] . . . no court has yet considered how the limitation
of liability is to be construed in the light of this technological changer'4
The variance in liability limitations and exemptions available to the
different modes of carriage becomes a cumbersome burden on transpor-
tation when carriers subject to different standards of liability are com-
bined for an intermodal shipment. Thus, if a shipment is carried for a
portion of its journey by rail or truck, the carrier's liability is relatively
strict. If the shipment is transferred to an air carrier or carrier by sea,
the liability becomes limited.
C. The Applicability of the Carmack Amendment to
International Shipments
The Carmack Amendment makes any common carrier or railroad re-
ceiving or delivering property liable, to the lawful holder of a receipt or
bill of lading or to any party entitled to recover thereon, for the full
value of any actual loss, damage or injury to such property caused by
that carrier or by any other carrier to whom the property is passed within
the United States or an adjacent foreign country when transported on a
through bill of lading, notwithstanding any attempted limitation of lia-
bility, unless the carrier has obtained a released rate order authorized by
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the shipper declares the re-
leased value in writing. 5 There is no statutory reference to shipments
from the United States to non-adjacent foreign countries or from foreign
countries, whether or not adjacent to the United States.
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, rail carriers,00 motor carriers,07
and water carriers s may establish with each other "through routes"-
arrangements between connecting carriers for the continuous carriage of
goods from an originating point on the line of one carrier to a destination
point on the line of another carrier-and "joint rates," the essential fea-
ture of which is an agreement between connecting carriers to carry traffic
from points on one road to points on another road or line for an aggre-
64. Id. at 945 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). The two exceptions mentioned
were the lower court opinion in the Standard Electrica case, 262 F. Supp. 343 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), aft'd, 375 F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1967), and United Purveyors, Inc. v. Motor Vessel New
Yorker, 250 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
65. 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1964). There are other liability limitations which are not within
the scope of this article.
66. Id. § 15(4).
67. Id. § 316(c).
68. Id. § 905.
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gate charge which is generally less than the sum of their individual local
charges between the same points.' Where such a joint undertaking to
provide through service to a shipper exists, all the carriers who are parties
to the through route service may be jointly and severally liable to the
shipper."
The case of Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Porter"' involved a shipment
of cotton from Arkansas to England. The cotton was delivered to the
carrier in Arkansas. The carrier issued an export bill of lading in two
parts-the first for the inland haul by the rail carrier to Georgia, the sec-
ond for the ocean carriage from Georgia to England by steamship. There-
after, and before the railroad cars were moved from Arkansas, the cotton
was destroyed by fire. The bill of lading exempted the carrier from liabil-
ity for loss by fire, but an Arkansas statute made an agreement by a
railroad limiting its common law liability unlawful. The United States
Supreme Court, holding that Congress had pre-empted the field, reversed
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas which had ruled in favor
of the shipper. Mr. Justice Butler stated that the Carmack Amendment
does not apply to a shipment received for transportation over an inter-
state inland route to a seaport for eventual delivery to a foreign vessel
for ocean carriage to a non-adjacent foreign country. -
69. See Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. v. United States, 366 U.S. 745, 747 nn.3-4 (1961).
The term "Through Route" was also defined in Thompson v. United States, 343 U.S. S49
(1952). "A through route is a continuous line of [carriage] formed by an arrangement, ex-
press or implied, between connecting carriers. . . . Existence of a through route is to be
determined by the incidents and circumstances of the shipment, such as the billing, the trans-
fer from one carrier to another, the collection and division of transportation charges, or the
use of a proportional rate to or from junction points or basing points. These incidents named
are not to be regarded as exclusive of others which may tend to establish a carrier's course
of business with respect to through shipments." Id. at 557, citing 21 ICC Ann. Rep. 75-76
(1907).
The Federal Maritime Commission has promulgated the following definition for persons
and carriers subject to its jurisdiction, including non-vessel operating common carriers by
water (NVO's):
"(a) Definitions. The following definitions shall apply for the purposes of this section.
(1) Through route: An arrangement for the continuous carriage of goods between points
of origin and destination, either or both of which lie beyond port terminal areas;
(2) Through rate: A rate expressed as a single number representing the charge to the
shipper by a carrier or carriers holding out to provide transportation over a through route;
(3) Joint rate: A through rate in which two or more carriers participate by agreement for
the offering of through transportation over a through route published in the same tariff .... 
46 C.F.R. § 536.16 (1971).
70. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. FMC, 404 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Freight forwarders
are not authorized by statute to have through routes with other carriers.
71. 273 U.S. 341 (1927).
72. Id. at 345.
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In Reider v. Thompson,78 a shipment had been sent by steamship from
Buenos Aires, Argentina, to the United States. The ocean bill of lading
designated the consignee and destination as "PORT OF DISCHARGE
OF THE SHIP New Orleans... destination of the goods: ... SHIPPER
TO THE ORDER OF: The First National Bank of Boston . .. ."'
At New Orleans the shipment was transferred in allegedly good condition
to a railroad for transportation to Boston. On arrival in Boston it was
discovered that the shipment was damaged. The railroad, which had
issued its own bill of lading in New Orleans designating H.P. Lambert
Co. as shipper, and H.P. Lambert Co. of Boston as consignee, claimed
that it was not liable under the Carmack Amendment since the shipment
was a "through foreign shipment" and the bill of lading issued by the
railroad was a mere "supplemental bill of lading."
The Supreme Court held that the liability of the rail carrier was to be
determined under the Interstate Commerce Act and that the Carmack
Amendment was applicable.75 Mr. Justice Minton, writing for the Court,
stated:
The issue is whether this transaction is within the Carmack Amendment. But basi-
cally, the problem here is one of liability. The contract giving rise to liability-the
bill of lading-is our primary aid in solving that problem. So we turn to the contract
to ascertain whether it evidences a transaction within the Carmack Amendment.
Does the fact that the shipment in this case originated in a foreign country take it
without the Carmack Amendment? We think not. There was no through bill of lading
from Buenos Aires to Boston. The record does not show the slightest privity between
respondent and the ocean carrier. The contract for ocean transportation terminated
at New Orleans. Having terminated, nothing of it remained for the new, separate, and
distinct domestic contract of carriage to "supplement." Even the parties to the ocean bill
of lading and the domestic bill of lading were different. If the various parties dealing
with this shipment separated the carriage into distinct portions by their contracts, it is
not for courts judicially to meld the portions into something they are not. The test is
not where the shipment originated, but where the obligation of the carrier as receiving
carrier originated .... Thus it is not significant that the shipment in this case origi-
nated in a foreign country, since the foreign portion of the journey terminated at the
border of the United States. The obligation as receiving carrier originated when re-
spondent issued its original through bill of lading at New Orleans. That contract of
carriage was squarely within the provisions of the statute.76
Mr. Justice Minton also stated that the sole issue in the Porter case had
been whether federal regulation had covered the field to the exclusion of
state regulation. He implied that the reference to the Carmack Amend-
ment was dictum.""
73. 339 U.S. 113 (1950).
74. Id. at 116.
75. Id. at 117.
76. Id. (citations omitted).
77. Id. at 116 n.1.
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented in the Reider case on the ground
that the conclusion in Porter was that the Carmack Amendment does not
apply to an unbroken transaction of commerce with a non-adjacent
country. He felt that to decide the precise question in Porter the Court
had to consider the regulatory liability scheme under the Interstate Com-
merce Act 8
In United States v. Erie Railroad70 a case not involving the Carmack
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court considered a shipment
which was imported from a foreign country and then transshipped on new
bills of lading by railroad to an inland point. Mr. Justice Brandeis held
that the rail transportation was a part of foreign commerce. The emphasis
was put upon the continuing intent of the shipper that the shipment
should be transported to the inland point within the United States.
To reverse the lower court judgment in Porter, it was necessary for the
Supreme Court to determine that the Carmack Amendment was not
applicable, since the Carmack Amendment declares void any limitation
of liability in a bill of lading unless a released rate order has been ap-
proved by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Therefore, if the Arkan-
sas statute was void and the Carmack Amendment applicable, the rail
carrier could not prevail. Reider, however, held the Amendment was
applicable under similar circumstances. The determination in Reider that
the Carmack Amendment is applicable to loss or damage sustained by
an imported shipment while being transported within the United States
was only a partial victory for the shipper, since the Carmack Amendment
specifically provides:
[I]f the loss, damage, or injury occurs while the property is in the custody of a
carrier by water the liability of such carrier shall be determined by the bill of lading
of the carrier by water and by and under the laws and regulations applicable to
transportation by water, and the liability of the initial or delivering carrier -hall be
the same as that of such carrier by water .... o
To avoid this limited liability the shipper would be compelled to prove
that the shipment was in good order and condition when received by the
domestic carrier within the United States and damaged when delivered,,
Since Reider arose on a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a claim," - the shipper would still be compelled at the trial to prove
the condition of the shipment at the time of delivery to the rail carrier.
Unless the containers were opened and inspected after unloading them
78. Id. at 119-20 (dissenting opinion).
79. 280 U.S. 98 (1929).
80. 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1964).
81. 339 U.S. at 118.
82. Id. at 115.
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from the ship and before loading them on the rail carrier, this burden of
proof would be difficult to sustain. It is noteworthy that there is no sim-
ilar provision granting an overland carrier subject to the Carmack Amend-
ment the benefit of the limited liability of an air carrier or restricting the
shipper to the limited liability of an air bill of lading if the loss or dam-
age occurs while the property is in the custody of an air carrier.
D. The Effect of Single Through Bills of Lading on
International Shipments
1. The Effect of the Carmack Amendment
The advent of containers, new technology, and international intermodal
transportation systems requires a reconsideration of the allocation of the
risk of loss or damage, and the establishment of uniform liability limi-
tations for all modes of transportation. There are transportation com-
panies today which will transport a container or shipment from places of
origin located throughout the United States to places of destination on
other continents on a through bill of lading and at a joint rate. This type
of intermodal service has required the joint consent of the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Federal Maritime Commission, and the
modification of the liability provisions of the bill of lading.
Except for an insured shipper's right to recover from its insurer, a
shipper's right to compensation for loss and damage, as well as the
amount of compensation the shipper receives, varies with the mode of
transportation used and may change for a particular shipment from time
to time as the shipment is transferred from one mode to another before
delivery at destination. Assuming the initial choice of a transportation
company by a shipper is based on the business needs of the shipper in
terms of cost of transportation, convenience and requirements for speed
in delivery or other special requirements of the shipper, then from the
shipper's viewpoint the ability to recover fully for loss or damage is de-
pendent on incidental happenstance. The economic justification for favor-
ing protection of air and sea carriers over railroads, motor carriers and
freight forwarders seems doubtful when viewed with regard to the totality
of transportation. Air transportation is no longer a new industry requiring
greater protection than the troubled railroad and freight forwarder sys-
tems, nor is there any justification for subjecting motor carriers to greater
risk than sea carriers.
Since the liability of rail and motor carriers, freight forwarders, and
express companies can not be modified below the standards established
by the Carmack Amendment, the creation of a single bill of lading for
an international through route has required that the liability of the car-
rier for the water or sea portion of the transportation be enlarged. Thus,
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at least one of the common international through bills of lading provides
that the carrier must waive the immunities and defenses to liability avail-
able to it under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act ' and the Harter Act,
thereby avoiding a conflict with the Carmack Amendment. This includes
a waiver by the carrier of the five hundred dollars per package limitation
on liability. The waiver of liability exclusion and the agreement by the
carrier by sea to a higher amount of liability is authorized by statute."'
Presumably the competitive advantage in its relation to other U.S. carriers
created by the ability to offer such service, and the rates charged, are
sufficient to compensate the carrier for its increased liability.
Among the many open questions involved in the use of a single inter-
national intermodal through bill of lading would be whether the waiver of
liability by the ocean carrier constitutes discrimination between com-
peting shippers. 6 For instance, if a shipper desires to employ an ocean
carrier subject to COGSA solely for water transportation, is the shipper
entitled to similar waivers of liability?
2. An International Solution-The TCM Convention
The Comit6 Maritime International (CMI), an organization of mari-
time law associations from many nations, at a conference in Tokyo in
1969 adopted a Draft Convention on Combined Transportation known
as the Tokyo Rules 7 which was amended during 1970 by a new draft
known as the "TCM Convention.""8 The delegates and committee mem-
bers considered the problems of intermodal transportation and the use of
containers. The draft proposed rules which would be applicable to a bill
of lading if the bill contained the words "Combined Transport Document
governed by the TCM Convention."Su The provisions of such a bill of
lading would then be applicable to transportation involving two or more
different kinds or modes of transportation, i.e., truck, water, rail or air."
The carrier who issued the bill of lading, known as the Combined
Transport Operator (CTO), would be liable for any loss or damage
occurring to the goods from the time he received them until the time they
are delivered,9' unless the loss or damage arose from the consignor's han-
dling, act or neglect, the consignee's handling, the carriers compliance
83. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1964).
84. Id. §§ 190-96.
85. Id. §§ 1304(5), 1305.
86. See id. § 1309.
87. 1 J. Maritime L. & Commerce 186 (1969).
88. H/11970 Baltic & Int'l Maritime Conf. Bull. 114.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 115.
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with authorized instructions, defective packaging, strikes, or any other
unavoidable causes. 2 The liability of the CTO for loss or damage to
property would be limited to an amount left open for future determi-
nation.93 The TCM Convention provides for a through intermodal bill of
lading substantially different from the one presently being used in the
United States since the CTO would not be subject to the prohibitions
against limitations of liability contained in the Carmack Amendment.
Drafts of the TCM Convention are being circulated through diplomatic
channels and are expected to be considered at a later Maritime Diplo-
matic Conference.
E. The Problem of Inter-Carrier Liability
In addition to the problem of liability of the carrier to the shipper, in-
termodal transportation indirectly involves the problem of the liability of
one carrier to another. The Interstate Commerce Act specifically provides
for a claim over to a carrier who has paid or becomes obligated to pay for
a loss, against a carrier on whose line the loss occurred.0 4 It is often dif-
ficult to establish which carrier is responsible for the loss after the dis-
covery by the consignee of the damage to the shipment. Furthermore,
where overland carriers subject to the Carmack Amendment and carriers
not subject to the Amendment are involved in one shipment, there is a
substantial risk to the overland carrier of being fully liable to the shipper
and having only a limited right of recovery against the non-Carmack
carrier.
Consider the problem of establishing liability for damages to a ship-
ment accepted by a freight forwarder in New York in a sealed container
which is delivered on a trailer by the forwarder to a motor vehicle com-
mon carrier, shipped piggy-back on the lines of three different connecting
railroads and then re-delivered to the freight forwarder for delivery to a
consignee in Oregon where, upon ultimate delivery, the container is
opened by the consignee and the entire shipment is discovered to be dam-
aged. Under the Carmack Amendment the shipper can hold either the
initial or the delivering carrier liable for the loss without proving neg-
ligence and without proving on which carrier's line the loss occurred. 0
An initial carrier who is compelled to pay the loss may recover from the
carrier responsible for the loss, 0 but the initial carrier in such instance
may, in trying to pass along the blame and risk of loss to another carrier,
92. Id. at 115-16.
93. Id. at 116.
94. 49 U.S.C. § 20(12) (1964).
95. Id. § 20(11).
96. Id. § 20(12).
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face the insurmountable problem of trying to prove who was responsible.
A freight forwarder may attempt to impose responsibility for the loss
upon a railroad carrier by alleging that improper humping of freight cars
or rough handling caused the damage. A railroad may try to pass the
responsibility to a connnecting railroad, or to the freight forwarder, by
claiming that the cause of the loss was improper bracing by the forwarder.
The result is what may be called the circularity of the accusing finger.
Liability will often turn on who was the first one not to receive a clean
receipt for the goods. Although this seems to be the best available test,
it may only indicate who noticed the damage first rather than on whose
line or vehicle the damage occurred.
The presumption is that the goods were in the same condition when
received by a connecting carrier as they were when delivered to the initial
carrier, and the burden is cast upon the connecting carrier to overcome
that presumption. 7 The fact remains that whenever there is an attempt
to shift liability from one carrier to another there is a duplication of work
and a general increase in the cost of investigation, administration, and
legal fees created by the necessary complexity of an action involving
numerous parties.
Within segments of the transportation industry there have been at-
tempts to simplify the allocation of responsibility for loss. Thus, the
American Association of Railroads has established rules for the allocation
of loss and damage among its member railroads. 8 The National Freight
Claims Council of the American Trucking Associations, Inc., has done
the same for its members. However, the effect of these Associations'
agreements is limited to their own members. Therefore, these agreements
fail to respond to the transportation industry at large or to the commer-
cial community, which is becoming increasingly dependent upon inter-
modal transportation. There is no established procedure except litigation,
either by statute or by agreement, for the allocation of the risk of loss
between the separate modes of transportation.
IV. THE ROLE OF INSURANCE IN ALLOCATION OF TcE RISK oF Loss
Although common carriers subject to the Carmack Amendment of the
Interstate Commerce Act are held to a high standard of liability, there
are some exceptions and limitations to a carrier's liability. 0 Furthermore,
the amount of damages sustained is always a potential issue. If the loss
97. See Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. C.C. Whitnack Produce Co., 258 U.S. 369 (1922); Rem-
ington v. Barrett, 196 App. Div. 838, 840, 188 N.Y.S. 174, 175 (4th Dep't 1921), aff'd mem.,
235 N.Y. 519, 139 N.E. 717 (1923).
98. Association of American Railroads, Operations and Freight Claim Division, Rules
of Order, Principles and Practices, Freight Claim Rules, 1962.
99. See notes 22-25 supra and accompanying text.
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or damage is substantial, the carrier will contest the claim, provided it
can find a legal basis upon which to do so. Consequently, most commer-
cial shippers are insured against loss or damage to their property during
the course of its transportation.
The shipper's insurance company may be considered as a potential
third-party upon whom the ultimate economic burden of the risk of loss
or damage should be placed, since the insurance company receives its
compensation specifically for assuming the risk of loss or damage,
whereas the carrier's compensation is based primarily on the cost of
transportation. However, equity and economic burden have usually not
been determining factors in allocating the risk of loss between the ship-
per's insurer and the carrier. The judicial resolution of the problem has
historically been based upon the law of contracts and the interpretation
of the Interstate Commerce Act.
A. Benefit of Insurance Clauses in Bills of Lading
For over a century the standard form of carrier bill of lading has pro-
vided, in effect, that if a shipper of merchandise has purchased insurance
against loss or damage to the shipper's goods during the course of their
transportation, and if the shipper's goods are lost or damaged, the carrier
shall receive the benefit of such insurance. The intended result of such a
clause is that the carrier will not be liable for the loss or damage to the
extent that the shipper or owner is compensated by his insurance carrier.
Judicial recognition of the validity of such benefit of insurance clauses
has been established.10 9
An insurer who pays the loss of a shipper is ordinarily subrogated to
the shipper's rights. However, if the insured has contracted with the car-
rier giving the carrier the benefit of any insurance available to the shipper
in case of loss or damage, then it has long been held that the insurer loses
its right of subrogation.' 0' The shipper who insures his goods against
loss or damage during their transportation is involved in at least two
separate contracts-the contract between the shipper and the common
carrier (the bill of lading), and the contract between the shipper and
the insurance company (the policy). To counterbalance the benefit of
100. E.g., cases cited in Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 984 (1969).
101. E.g., Wager v. Providence Ins. Co., 150 U.S. 99 (1893); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Eric &
W. Transp. Co., 117 U.S. 312 (1886); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Payne, 199 Iowa 1008, 203
N.W. 4 (1925); Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Blum, 124 Miss. 318, 86 So. 805 (1921); Mercantile
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Calebs, 20 N.Y. 173 (1859); North British & Mer. Ins. Co. v. Central
Vt. R.R., 9 App. Div. 4, 40 N.Y.S. 1113 (3d Dep't 1896), aff'd mem., 158 N.Y. 726, 53 N.E.
1128 (1899); Roos v. Philadelphia, W. & B.R.R., 199 Pa. 378, 49 A. 344 (1901); Home Ins.
Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 18 Wash. 2d 798, 140 P.2d 507 (1943); see Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d
984 (1969) ; 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 399 (1939).
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insurance clause in the bill of lading, the insurance companies changed
their policies and added a provision which stated that if an insured ship-
per entered into an agreement giving a carrier the benefit of the shipper's
insurance, then the insurance policy issued to the shipper would be void.
The courts, when faced with both the bill of lading provision giving
the carrier the benefit of the shipper's insurance and the insurance policy
declaring the policy void upon the shipper's acceptance of such a bill of
lading provision, concluded that both agreements were effective, i.e., the
shipper could agree with the carrier to give the carrier the benefit of the
shipper's insurance, but since the insurance was void the carrier received
nothing and the shipper could not receive the insurance proceeds.'2 This,
of course, was harmful to the shipper and of no benefit to the carrier. The
legal draftsmen of the insurance companies were victorious in their word
war with the carriers' scriveners.
The bill of lading was then amended to provide that the carrier was
to have the benefit of the insurance effected by the shipper "so far as this
shall not avoid the policies or contracts of insurance." Thus, if the insur-
ance policy stated that the policy would be void if the carrier could get
the benefit of insurance, the bill of lading provision stated that in such
event the carrier would not get the benefit of the shipper's insurance. The
draftsmen for both sides had created a state of equilibrium,0 3 except in
those cases where an insurance company neglected to provide that the
policy would be void if the carrier received the benefit of the shipper's
insurance. Thus the determination whether the ultimate burden of loss
should be borne by the carrier or the shipper's insurer was made on the
basis of interpretation of conflicting contracts without consideration of
the economic justification of placing the burden either on the carrier or the
insurer and without consideration of its effect upon interstate commerce.
China Fire Insurance Co. v. Davis' 4 involved the standard bill of lad-
ing provision which gave a common carrier by railroad subject to section
2 of the Interstate Commerce Act 0 5 the benefit of any insurance that may
have been effected upon the property so far as this would not void the
policies or contracts of insurance. The shipper in this case had been paid
for its loss by the carrier after the shipper and carrier had entered into
102. Fayerweather v. Phenix Ins. Co., 118 N.Y. 324, 23 N.E. 192 (1890).
103. See Richard D. Brew & Co. v. Audair Transp., Inc., 105 N.H. 370, 211 A.2d 897
(1965); Towmotor Co. v. Frank Cross Trucking Co., 205 Pa. Super. 448, 211 A.2d 38
(1965). Some policies provided that if there were a benefit of insurance clause in the bill of
lading the insured could collect from the insurer only what could not be collected from the
carrier. See Kalle & Co. v. Morton, 156 App. Div. 522, 141 N.Y.S. 374 (1st Dep't 1913),
aff'd mem., 216 N.Y. 655, 110 N.E. 1043 (1915).
104. 50 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 658 (1931).
105. 49 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
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an agreement which required the shipper to make a claim against its in-
surer, attempt to collect from its insurer, and then remit the amount col-
lected less the cost of collection to the carrier. 10 This shipper subse-
quently collected from its insurer without disclosing the prior payment
from the carrier and a year later remitted a sum equivalent to the net
insurance proceeds to the carrier. The policy did not prohibit the carrier
from obtaining the benefit of the shipper's insurance but the insurer,
after discovering the facts, brought an action to recover the money from
the carrier. Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, held that the in-
surer was entitled to recover from the carrier the money which was "un-
lawfully held" by the carrier. °7 The benefit of insurance provision in the
bill of lading was held to be void as an unlawful discrimination prohibited
by section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act,108 which prohibits a carrier
from receiving from any person, directly or indirectly, a greater compen-
sation for transportation of property then it receives from any other per-
son for a like and contemporaneous service under similar conditions.
Since the shipper was free to insure the carrier or not, as he chose, the
court found such insurance to be "compensation" within the meaning of
section 2 of the Act, since the right to receive the benefit of insurance had
a present value whether or not it cost the shipper anything extra. 09
The bill of lading provision involved in a subsequent case, National
Garment Co. v. New York Central & St. Louis Railroad,"0 had been
modified by the carrier's attorneys, perhaps in an attempt to overcome
the claim of discrimination involved in the China Fire case. Here the
bill of lading gave the carrier the benefit of the shipper's insurance if the
policy was not thereby voided. The bill of lading also required that in
the event of loss the carrier must reimburse the shipper for the cost of the
shipper's insurance. The court held that this bill of lading provision was
also void under section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act, since the return
to the shipper of the cost of the compensation which the carrier was for-
bidden by the Act to receive in the first place was an avoidance of liability
by the carrier, and deprived the insurer of its rights under a valid con-
tract."'
There is substantial basis for criticizing the decision in China Fire as
106. 50 F.2d at 390.
107. Id. at 393.
108. 49 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
109. 50 F.2d at 392.
110. 173 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1949). See also Beaumont v. Pennsylvania R.R., 127 N.Y.S.2d
216 (Sup. Ct. 1953), modified, 284 App. Div. 354, 131 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1st Dep't 1954), aff'd
mem., 308 N.Y. 920, 127 N.E.2d 80, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 838 (1955).
111. 173 F.2d at 37.
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being unreasonable. 1 2 All shippers pay the same shipping rate whether or
not the shipment is insured. Consequently, the benefit of insurance clause
does not create discrimination in the rates of shipment. Furthermore, it
is possible for a shipment to be lost or damaged without liability to the
carrier, 3 since the carrier is not absolutely liable for every loss from any
and every cause." 4 A shipper may carry its own insurance to avoid the
danger that the carrier may not be liable, in which case a carrier receiving
the benefit of such insurance is a mere incidental beneficiary. The carrier
as a general rule does not know in advance, or at the time it accepts a
shipment, whether the shipment has been insured by the shipper or by
anyone other than the carrier. Consequently, there can be no knowing
discrimination. The carrier cannot make a choice of carrying a shipment
insured by a shipper or of refusing to carry a shipment which has not been
insured. This, together with the fact that most insurance policies contain
a clause rendering the policy void if the bill of lading contains a benefit
of insurance clause, renders the danger of deliberate discrimination
hypothetical.
If the carrier receives an advantage, it is not as compensation for
carriage nor as a result of preferential treatment. Thus, the carrier who
receives the benefit of a shipper's insurance may be considered to be in
the same position as a carrier who receives a credit for the amount of
salvage obtained by a shipper for a damaged shipment upon the carrier
making payment to the shipper for his actual loss. When compared with
other benefits which a shipper may confer on a carrier, the agreement to
give the carrier the benefit of shipper's insurance is clearly not discrim-
inatory."15 Furthermore, whether the benefit of insurance provision in the
bill of lading is discriminatory is a matter which should be determined
by the Interstate Commerce Commission."'
Although "a common carrier may not provide that it shall not be liable
unless the shipper insures the goods for its benefit,"'17 it may take out
its own insurance policy to cover itself for loss of a shipper's goods with-
out violating the statute." 8 Modern ideas of the administration of risk
112. 10 S. Williston, Contracts § 1118 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1967).
113. 26 Il1. L. Rev. 566, 567-69 (1932).
114. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137 (1964); Adams Express
Co. v. Croninger, 226 US. 491, 506 (1913).
115. For instance, a shipper may elect not to make a claim or bring suit against a carrier
or it may elect to settle a claim for less than the full value without violating the Interstate
Commerce Act. See generally 26 Ill. L. Rev. 566, 567 (1932).
116. 41 Yale L.J. 303, 305 (1931).
117. 10 S. Wflliston, Contracts § 1118, at 273 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1967); see Inman v.
South Carolina Ry., 129 U.S. 128 (1889); Annot., 27 A.L.R.3d 984 (1969).
118. See Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Co., 248 US. 139, 146 (1918). See also
Axton-Fisher Tobacco Co. v. Ziffrin Truck Lines, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 777 (1941), afPd mem,
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and the true basis of a carrier's liability do not support a theory that the
carrier should ultimately bear the loss regardless of its fault. The real
issue is not one of discrimination but whether the ultimate liability for
loss should fall upon the insurer whose business it is to take such risks
for compensation or upon the carrier whose business is transportation.
Thus, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington refused to follow the
holding of China Fire since it did not deem that decision to be logical or
sound. Justice Grady, in his excellent analysis of the problem in Home
Insurance Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway,"" called attention to the pur-
pose of the statute2 ° which is "to enforce equality between shippers over
the same line, and to prohibit any rebate or other device by which two ship-
pers, shipping over the same line, the same distance, and under the same
circumstances of carriage, are compelled to pay different prices there-
for."' 2 Justice Grady stated that the provision in the bill of lading giving
the carrier the benefit of insurance on the goods is merely a recognition by
the shipper that he is not entitled to collect twice-from the carrier and the
insurer-for the same loss; that by receiving the benefit of insurance
the carrier does not thereby render service to a shipper for a rate less than
the published tariff rates charged to all shippers; that the receipt of the
benefit of insurance is not compensation; and that the purpose of the stat-
ute was not to prohibit the benefit of insurance provision in the bill of
lading. The insurance company, having been compensated for the risk it
assumed, was determined to be the proper party to bear the ultimate
burden of the loss."' The court in Home Insurance, while recognizing
that the construction of a federal statute by a United States court of
appeals is entitled to great weight when the same statute is involved in a
case before a state court, nonetheless held that they were not bound by
China Fire because the construction of the federal statute was neither
logical nor sound."as
The New York courts have held that they are not obligated to follow
the construction of a federal statute by a federal court inferior to the
Supreme Court.' 24 However, when the New York Court of Appeals was
126 F.2d 476 (6th Cir. 1942), where a motor carrier paid the insurance premium for shipper's
benefit and the carrier was permitted to claim over against the insurer after the shipper
sustained a loss.
119. 18 Wash. 2d 798, 140 P.2d 507 (1943).
120. 49 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
121. 18 Wash. 2d at 809, 140 P.2d at 512, citing 49 U.S.C.A. § 2 at 194 n.2 (1959).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 808, 140 P.2d at 511.
124. E.g., People ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 294 N.Y. 61, 73, 60 N.E.2d 541, 547 (1945),
aff'd, 326 U.S. 496 (1946); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Lackawanna Steel Co.,
164 Misc. 498, 299 N.Y.S. 862 (Sup. Ct. 1937), aff'd sub nom. Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 254 App. Div. 839, 6 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1st Dep't 1938), rev'd,
279 N.Y. 495, 18 N.E.2d 673, rev'd, 307 U.S. 265 (1939).
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faced with the prospect of determining the validity of the "benefit of
insurance" clause, it felt compelled to follow the holding in China Fire
since this was the federal law on a federal question. In Salon Service, Inc.
v. Pacific & Atlantic Shippers, Inc.125 the freight forwarder's bill of lading
contained the following standard provision:
Any carrier or party liable on account of loss of or damage to any of said property
shall have the full benefit of any insurance that may have been effected upon or on
account of said property, so far as this shall not avoid the policies or contracts of in-
surance. Provided, that the carrier reimburse the claimant for the premium paid
thereon. 12
6
The shipper's insurance policy provided that the "insurance shall not
inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of the carrier or other bailee, by
stipulation in bill of lading or otherwise,"'1 7 but did not provide that the
policy would become void if the bill of lading gave the carrier the benefit
of insurance. The policy also contained the following provisions:
Bill of Lading, Contracts, Etc.:
16. Privilege is granted hereunder to accept receipts, contracts, bills of lading or other
documents issued by carriers or others limiting their liability or releasing them from
all liability and this insurance shall in no wise be prejudiced by such limit or release.'r 8
The shipper had delivered 12 cartons of wigs to a freight forwarder in
New York City for delivery to a consignee in Illinois. The freight for-
warder tendered delivery to the consignee in Illinois who refused to accept
the shipment. Before the shipment could be returned to the shipper the
shipment disappeared. The shipper's insurance company paid the shipper,
who executed a "loan receipt" acknowledging that the insurance company
had loaned the insurance proceeds to the shipper. The loan to the shipper
was without interest and was to be repaid solely from any recovery the
shipper received from the freight forwarder." The shipper's insurance
125. 30 App. Div. 2d 190, 291 N.Y.S.2d 79 (Ist Dep't 1968), aff'd, 24 N.Y2d 15, 246
N.E.2d 509, 298 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1969).
126. 24 N.Y.2d at 18-19, 246 N.E.2d at 510-11, 298 N.YS.2d at 702.
127. Id. at 18, 246 N.E.2d at 510, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
128. 30 App. Div. 2d at 191-92, 291 N.Y..2d at 80-81.
129. Record at 37, Salon Serv., Inc. v. Pacific & AUt. Shippers, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 15, 246
N.E.2d 509, 298 N.Y.S.2d 700 (1969). In The J.L. Luckenbach, 65 F.2d 570, 574-75 (2d
Cir. 1933), a federal court held that where a bill of lading provided that the carrier should
receive the benefit of insurance paid to the shipper, it could not receive the benefit of a loan
made by the insurer to the shipper. The loan and loan receipt have long been used to avoid
the benefit of insurance clause in bills of lading. Bolton v. Ziegler, I11 F. Supp. 516, 527
(N.D. Iowa 1953). The nature of the transaction, whether it be a payment or a loan, de-
pends on the intent of the parties. Luckenbach v. W.J. McCahan Sugar Co., 248 U.S. 139,
149 (1918). The claim of the insured in China Fire Ins. Co. v. Davis, 50 F.2d 389 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 658 (1931), was also paid as a loan by the insurer but the court in-
dicated that the party to sustain the ultimate burden of the loss would be determined by
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company then commenced an action in the shipper's name against the
freight forwarder for the loss of the shipment. The freight forwarder as-
serted as an affirmative defense that it was entitled to the benefit of the
shipper's insurance.130
The appellate division dismissed the affirmative defense. While the
court indicated that prior suits on this issue had been decided on the
ground that the carrier may not relieve itself of liability for its own fault,
or alternatively that public policy required that a carrier should not be
able to avoid the restrictions of the Interstate Commerce Act against
preferential treatment, it based its decision in Salon Service on the need
of the commercial community for a uniform standard:
the validity of the bill of lading provision giving the carrier the benefit of the shipper's
insurance.
Loan receipts are usually sham devices employed by the insurance companies as a "facade
to permit the third-party action to be prosecuted in the name of the insured." Herbert
Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 21 App. Div. 2d 160, 162,
249 N.Y.S.2d 208, 211 (1st Dep't 1964), aff'd mem., 17 N.Y.2d 857, 218 N.E.2d 327, 271
N.Y.S.2d 287 (1966).
It is no longer necessary for the court in New York to be a party to the sham, since by
statute an "insured person who has executed to his insurer either a loan or subrogation re-
ceipt, trust agreement, or other similar agreement ...may sue or be sued without joining
with him the person for or against whose interest the action is brought." N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 1004 (McKinney 1963). In the Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. case, the appellate division
determined that payment made by an insurer to its insured was not a loan despite the fact
that the insured had executed a "loan receipt." Justice Breitel stated that "modern juris-
prudence should not have any difficulty in avoiding 'word talismanship'. The contrary would
mean that the fiction of the loan receipt is permitted to behave as a monster, independently
of the purpose of its creation, wreaking irrational havoc." 21 App. Div. 2d at 163, 249
N.Y.S.2d at 212. He further stated: "Firstly, whatever the four documents in this transaction
purported to express, it is perfectly clear that the purpose and effect of the transaction was
for the insurer to pay the loss, the insured receive the proceeds of the insurance promptly,
and for the insurer to be subrogated to the third-party claim to be prosecuted at its expense.
A reading of the loan receipt alone might not disclose this, but the insurance policy, the proof
of claim, and the draft endorsement, taken with the loan receipt, make the substance of the
transaction perfectly clear. Thus made clear, the loan receipt transaction is not a banking
or financing operation but a device for the payment absolute of an insurance loss, coupled
with a fictional implementation to permit the insurer to sue in the name of the Insured.
"Indeed, before the applicable statute had been amended it had been held, under docu-
ments similar to those in this case, that a loan receipt represented an absolute payment by
the insurer, and that the insurer, and not the insured, was the real party in interest . .. ."
Id. at 164, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 213. In Salon Serv., Inc. v. Pacific & AtI. Shippers, Inc., supra,
the appellate division stated: "In determining whether the provision in the bill of lading
shall take precedence over the clauses in the insurance policies or vice versa, we give no
weight to the fact that payment was made to plaintiff by means of a loan receipt. The use
of this patent device to obscure the fact or effect of payment is unavailing . . . ." 30 App.
Div. 2d at 192, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 81. See also Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 42 (1967).
130. 30 App. Div. 2d at 191, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 80.
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Whether either of these approaches appeals or whether the problem be regarded as
incapable of satisfactory solution by way of reason, there is substantial merit in ad-
hering to the determinations. The most significant factor in regard to the decisions is
that they provide a standard to the commercial community upon which to regulate
conduct. The practically uniform determinations in favor of the insurer provide such
a standard. For this reason the defense is unavailing and should be stricken.131
The appellate division preferred to attack the problem of "circularity of
expression"'132 between the bill of lading provision and the insurance pol-
icy provision on a broad economic basis by providing a standard against
which the court believed the commercial community should regulate its
conduct. The court recognized that factors other than statutory or con-
tractual interpretation were relevant considerations.
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals held that the state of the
federal law on the issue was decisive. Since the only federal cases which
had considered the question had determined that the provision of the bill
of lading was void as discriminatory under the Interstate Commerce Act,
the New York court was obligated to follow this determination.' In this
regard, it adopted a view opposite to that adopted by the Supreme Court
of the State of Washington.3 The result of these conflicting decisions is
that the validity of the "benefit of insurance" provision depends on which
state court considers the question, at least until the matter is "finally"
determined once again by the United States Supreme Court or by Con-
gress. This result is inconsistent with the need for a uniform law of trans-
portation in interstate commerce.
The bills of lading involved in the cases which considered the discrim-
inatory aspect of the "benefit of insurance" clause prior to Salon Service,
such as National Garment Co. v. New York Central & St. Louis Rail-
way,1 5 Home Insurance Co. v. Northern Pacific Railway,3" and Beau-
mont v. Pennsylvania Railroad,'37 were those of rail carriers subject to
Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act. The statute interpreted in all
these cases, and under which the provision in the bill of lading giving
the carrier the benefit of shipper's insurance was declared to be dis-
criminatory and void or not, was section 2 of Title 49 of the United
States Code,"s a section included in Part I of the Act. Richard D.
131. Id. at 192, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
132. Campbell, Non-Consensual Suretyship, 45 Yale LJ. 69, 85 (1935).
133. 24 N.Y.2d 15, 20, 246 N.E.2d 509, 511, 298 N.Y.S.2d 700, 703 (1969).
134. Home Ins. Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 18 Wash. 2d 798, 140 P.2d 507 (1943).
135. 173 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1949).
136. 18 Wash. 2d 798, 140 P.2d 507 (1943).
137. 127 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Sup. Ct. 1953), modified, 284 App. Div. 354, 131 N.YS2d 652
(1st Dep't 1954), aft'd, 308 N.Y. 920, 127 N.E.2d 80, cert. denied, 350 US. 838 (1955).
138. 49 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
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Brew & Co. v. Auclair Transportation, Inc.u9 and Towmotor Co. v.
Frank Cross Trucking Co.140 involved motor carriers subject to Part II
of the Interstate Commerce Act and not subject to the provisions of sec-
tion 2 of the Act which had been interpreted in China Fire. This distinc-
tion was perhaps not made by the courts in either Richard D. Brew or
Towmotor, because there is a similar non-discrimination clause applicable
to motor carriers. 4 '
Salon Service involved a determination of the validity of a benefit of
insurance clause in the bills of lading of freight forwarders. The for-
warder, in its relations with its customers, is subjected by the Interstate
Commerce Act to many of the requirements and regulations applicable to
other common carriers. In its relation with other carriers, the status of
the forwarder is that of a shipper." Freight forwarders in interstate
commerce were not subject to the Interstate Commerce Act until 1942
when Part IV of the Act (The Freight Forwarder Act) was passed by
Congress.14 However, freight forwarders are not included within the
definition of carriers subject to Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act'44
and are specifically excluded from Part I by the Freight Forwarder Act. 4
The result is that section 2 of the Interstate Commerce Act which was
interpreted in China Fire to preclude a benefit of insurance clause in a
bill of lading is not applicable to forwarders. On the other hand, section
1004(b) of the Act prohibits freight forwarders from giving any unrea-
sonable preference or advantage to any person or to subject such person
"to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage .... " 146 In Salon Service the benefit of insurance clause of a
bill of lading was held void as discriminatory under section 1004 (b) of the
Freight Forwarder Act. The court reasoned that if it was discriminatory
then the rationale would be the same under either statute. 47
The separation of powers provided for in the Constitution provides
that the determination of a standard for the commercial community is the
appropriate function for the legislative branch of government. It is not
the function of the courts to legislate under the guise of interpretation.
139. 106 N.H. 370, 211 A.2d 897 (1965).
140. 205 Pa. Super. 448, 211 A.2d 38 (1965).
141. 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1964).
142. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 336 U.S. 465, 468 (1949).
143. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-22 (1964).
144. Id. § 1(3) (a).
145. Id. § 1002 (a) (5) ; see United States v. Bethke, 132 F. Supp. 22 (D. Colo. 1955);
American Transp. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 300 Mich. 230, 1 N.W.2d 521 (1942).
146. 49 U.S.C. § 1004(b) (1964).
147. 24 N.Y.2d at 20-21, 246 N.E.2d at 512, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04.
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If evils exist, it is for the legislature to correct them.148 The courts are
ill-qualified to make basic judgments about economic policy, a function
which properly belongs to Congress. 14 9 Furthermore, Congress has pre-
empted the field, leaving no room for state regulation whether by a state
legislature or by a state court.'O Clearly, if the courts of the State of New
York were allowed to determine a standard for the commercial com-
munity involving carriers, then the courts of the other states might make
similar determinations leading to diverse regulations in a field which re-
quires uniformity. The liability provisions of an interstate bill of lading
may not be increased or diminished by local regulation or local view of
public policy. Otherwise, the provisions are less than supreme. Congress
intended to adopt a uniform rule and relieve such contracts from diverse
regulation.' 5
Congress alone can deal with interstate transportation of property, a
subject which requires national uniformity of regulation.1 2 Congress has
asserted its power over interstate shipments and over the subject of the
duty to issue bills of lading and the responsibility of carriers thereunder,
thereby excluding state legislation." The construction of bills of lading
for interstate shipments presents a federal question and not a state ques-
tion. Consequently, state courts in their construction are bound by fed-
eral law." It should be noted, however, that where Congress had an
opportunity to consider a "benefit of insurance" clause in a contract of
carriage in relation to carriage of goods by sea, it provided that such a
clause shall be deemed to be a clause relieving the carrier of liability and
therefore void.'55 Congress did not deem it to be discriminatory.
The litigation concerning the validity of the benefit of insurance clause
148. Order of R.R. Tel. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330, 342 (1960) ; Bright Homes,
Inc. v. Wright, 8 N.Y.2d 157, 162, 168 N.E.2d 515, 518, 203 N.Y.S.2d 67, 70 (1960); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Boland, 281 N.Y. 357, 361, 23 N.E.2d 532, 533 (1939); Hudson
Handkerchief Mfg. Corp. v. Porto Rican Exp. Co., 274 App. Div. 509, 514, 85 N.Y.S.2d 294,
299 (lst Dep't 1948).
149. American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & N.R.R., 392 US. 571, 590 (196S).
150. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1001-22 (1964).
151. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 506 (1913).
152. Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 776
(1947) ; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 204 (1885). See also Barstow
v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 158 App. Div. 665, 143 N.Y.S. 983 (1st Dep't 1913).
153. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Harold, 241 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1916).
154. Illinois Steel Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 320 US. 508, 510-11 (1944); Pennsylvania
R.R. v. LN. White & Co., 280 App. Div. 587, 588-89, 116 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363 (Ist Dep't
1952), aff'd mem., 305 N.Y. 801, 113 N.E.2d 553 (1953); Dodge & Dent Mfg. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 175 App. Div. 823, 827-28, 162 N.Y.S. 549, 553 (1st Dep't 1916).
155. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1964).
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has predominantly involved overland carriers, but the issue has also
affected carriers by water. In Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York
Tank Barge Corp.,'5" the contract of affreightment contained an under-
taking on the part of the shipper to effect insurance on cargoes for the
benefit of the carrier. This the shipper failed to do. The trial court held
that although the carrier had breached an express warranty to provide a
seaworthy vessel, it was not liable to the shipper due to the shipper's
breach of the contract to insure. In Allied Chemical Corp. v. Gulf Atlantic
Towing Corp., 5 7 the contract between the shipper and tower required the
shipper to carry insurance for its own account. The shipper by contract
waived claims against the tower resulting from torts arising in connection
with the agreement. The court found that damages sustained by the ship-
per were caused by the tower's negligence, but that the tower was entitled
to the benefit of the shipper's insurance and was therefore relieved of
liability for the insured loss.11
B. A Proposal to Change the Allocation and Burden of Risk
What the courts have failed to recognize is that litigation concerning
who should ultimately pay for cargo losses is today more often carried on
between insurers than between carriers and shippers. The Interstate Com-
merce Act and rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission require that
motor carriers and freight forwarders engaged in interstate commerce be
insured for cargo losses and that such carriers and forwarders furnish evi-
dence of such insurance or evidence of self-insurance to the Interstate
Commerce Commission.
15 9
The claimants and plaintiffs in the great majority of cases are insurers
either suing in their own name or in the name of the shipper as subrogee
of the shipper. The defendants are generally, although sometimes in-
156. 1939 A.M.C. 673 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 114 F.2d 248 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd, 314 U.S. 104
(1941). On appeal the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed on the ground that
the petitioner did not sustain its burden of proof, holding that even if the clause in the charter
regarding insurance did not cancel the warranty of seaworthiness, it was not necessary for
the court to pass upon that question. 114 F.2d at 252. Contra, Nelson Line, Ltd. v. James
Nelson & Sons, Ltd., [1908] A.C. 16, aff'g [1907] 1 K.B. 769.
157. 244 F. Supp. 2 (EJD. Va. 1964).
158. In relation to international intermodal shipments on a single through bill of lading
covering both the overland transportation and the carriage of goods by sea, a benefit of in-
surance clause would be void because it is void under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.
46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1964). The TCM Convention also deals with the "benefits of Insur-
ance" but it is not clear whether the insurance referred to is that obtained by the shipper
or by the CTO. Article 17, § 2 provides: "In particular, any clause assigning benefit of insur-
ance of the goods in favor of the CTO shall be null and void." 11/1970 Baltic & Int'l Mari-
time Conf. Bull. 114, 117.
159. 49 U.S.C. §§ 315, 1003 (1964).
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directly, either insurers defending under the carrier's policy and in the
carrier's name or the carrier itself in the role of a self-insured. Realistic-
ally, the immediate issue is not whether the shipper or the carrier should
bear the risk of loss but which insurance company should bear the
burden.
The present system of compensation to shippers for cargo losses is
unduly costly to both shippers and carriers because of the overlapping
duplication of insurance which essentially covers the risk of loss or dam-
age to the same goods. This becomes immediately obvious from an anal-
ysis of any insured intermodal movement of goods. Let us consider, e.g., a
shipment of goods from California to New York. The shipper usually in-
sures the goods against loss or damage during its transportation and pays
a premium to an insurance company. The shipper may then employ a
freight forwarder who is required by law to be insured for liability result-
ing from loss or damage to the shipper's cargo. The freight forwarder
may employ a local pick-up and delivery trucker to pick up the shipper's
goods and deliver them to the forwarder. Either by agreement with the
forwarder or otherwise the local pick-up and delivery trucker is usually
insured for cargo loss and damage. The freight forwarder, who is pro-
hibited from owning his own vehicle for transportation, may then deliver
the shipper's cargo to a motor carrier who is also required by the Inter-
state Commerce Act to be insured for cargo loss. The motor carrier, if it
has through routes to New York, may redeliver the trailer to the freight
forwarder in New York or, if it has no through route, the motor carrier
will deliver the trailer to other motor carriers, who are also required to
be insured, for ultimate redelivery to the freight forwarder in New York.
During the course of its transportation, the shipment might be carried
by rail, T.O.F.C., water or air. Although railroads, air carriers, and car-
riers of goods by water are not required by law to be insured for cargo
loss, most air and water carriers are insured. At New York the freight
forwarder will break bulk and may deliver the shipment to a local de-
livery trucker (who probably will be separately insured for cargo loss)
for ultimate delivery of the shipment to the consignee who may also be
insured. In the case of the shipper, owner, or consignee, the insurance is
to protect against loss or damage to the property. In the case of the car-
riers, the insurance is in the form of liability insurance. In either event
the risk is that the property being shipped will be lost or damaged. This
multiplicity of insurance premiums and duplication of coverage sub-
stantially increases the cost of the shipment of goods and unduly burdens
the free flow of commerce.
A reformation of the system of compensation to shippers for lost and
damaged cargo is needed to conform to the improved methods in the
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physical handling and movement of freight. Containerized freight and
intermodal transportation systems are no boon to a shipper whose cargo
is hijacked unless prompt compensation is made for the loss. However,
the burden of compensating the shipper for lost and damaged cargo
should not be the sole burden of the carrier, particularly when a sub-
stantial percentage of the losses incurred are not due to the fault of the
carrier held responsible. Furthermore, the carrier's rate structure is
established primarily on the basis of the cost of transportation rather
than on the risk of loss. The cost of compensation for loss should be con-
sidered as an element of the cost of transportation to be added to the cost
of the goods sold and ultimately included in the sale price of the goods.
It would also appear logical to hold all carriers involved in a through
shipment to the same standards of liability. It is therefore suggested that
the carrier's liability be limited on every shipment to the value of the
goods shipped or an arbitrary maximum sum per package, whichever is
lower, without a released rate order from the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission.' The risk of loss or damage in excess of the arbitrary maxi-
mum is more effectively compensated by insurance purchased by the
shipper. If a shipper indicated on the bill of lading that excess insurance
was desired on the value of the shipment, the insurance cost could be
separately rated similar to the manner in which transportation charges
are now rated and included as a separate item on the carrier's freight
bill.' 6 ' The obligation of the shipper to declare a value and pay an addi-
tional charge for compensation at full value in the event of a loss or
damage prevails for shipments by air freight and under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act and, prior to the Carmack Amendment, prevailed for
overland carriers. Insurance has historically been a proven method for
spreading risks.
The carriers will continue to have an incentive for prudence since they
are not totally free of liability. In this regard there will also remain the
competitive advantage of a reputation for safe transport. To the extent
that further incentives for prudence are required by particular carriers,
this would appear to be more appropriately a function of the Interstate
Commerce Commission or other regulatory agency charged with provid-
ing for the safety of systems and operations in the transportation of
freight. A shipper failing to purchase excess insurance through the carrier
should be limited to an arbitrarily established liability on the part of the
carrier in the event of loss or damage to the shipment.
160. See Limitation for Carriers under Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5)
(1964).
161. Air carriers and carriers of goods by sea presently require such a valuation state-
ment as a condition of avoiding limited liability by the carrier.
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The premium rates can be fixed with the knowledge that there will
be no right or only a limited right of subrogation against the carriers.
The right to subrogation, except where the loss is significant in amount,
is of limited benefit since the administrative and legal cost of collecting
from the carrier substantially reduces the amount recovered by the in-
surance companies; and the amount received by the insurer from the
common carrier is often less than the amount paid by the insurer to the
shipper.
The limitation of liability of motor carriers, freight forwarders, rail
carriers, and express companies to a fixed sum and the ability of such
carriers to offer all-risk insurance coverage at a price would result in
making the liability of carriers more uniform and more consistent with
that of carriers by air and carriers by sea.
V. CONCLUSION
The transportation industry has made dramatic advances in the tech-
nology and systems of freight movement. The trend in the transporta-
tion industry is to combine the various modes of transportation to
provide a shipper with a unified transportation system from source to
destination. This blending of modes of transportation, and the needs
created by technological changes, require a basic reconsideration of all
the laws concerning transportation of goods and a re-examination of the
division of jurisdiction among the regulatory agencies. 102 The patch-
work of laws created on an historical basis must be replaced by a single
transportation law applicable to all modes of transportation and adminis-
tered by a single agency.'6
The liability of carriers for loss or damage to goods should be uniform
for all modes of transport. The relatively unlimited liability of motor car-
riers, rail carriers, express companies, and freight forwarders should be
changed to make it consistent with the limited liability of domestic and
international air carriers and carriers of goods by sea. If the philosophy
limiting liability of air and sea carriers is appropriate there is no justifica-
tion for separation. Intermodal transportation requires a unitary concept
of liability.
162. See Note, Coordination of Intermodal Transportation, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 247, 274
(1969) ; Note, Legal and Regulatory Aspects of the Container Revolution, 57 Geo. L.J. 533
(1969).
163. See Panel Discussion, Coordinated Transport-Is a Single Federal Regulatory Com-
mission Needed? 36 ICC Prac. J. 1325, 1334-35 (1969); Note, Legal and Regulatory Aspects
of the Container Revolution, 57 Geo. L.J. 533, 550-51 (1969). A bill introduced in the United
States Senate in April, 1970, by Senator Baker of Tennessee would establish a Commission on
Transportation Regulatory Agencies to make a study concerning the advisability of merg-
ing the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board. S. Doc. No.
3760, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
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The effect of insurance upon loss and damage to shipments must also
be re-examined. The arguments concerning the validity of "benefit of in-
surance provisions" and the long history of litigation concerning this issue
is pointless and cries out for a uniform legislative solution by Congress.
The duplication of insurance coverage and the attendant increase in the
costs of insurance, investigation, and adjustment which vitally affect
interstate and foreign commerce also require a uniform legislative remedy.
To the extent that it is necessary to establish intercarrier liability on
intermodal shipments, the task of allocating the liability between carriers
should be a function of one administrative agency. The present limited
industry system of liability allocation established by the rail carriers for
themselves, and the motor carriers for themselves, does not answer the
problems of modern intermodal transportation. Nor does the present lim-
ited statutory right of a carrier held liable for a shipper's loss or damage
to claim over in certain instances against the carrier at fault,1' 4 provide
an adequate solution to the problem. Unification of transportation and
the needs of the commercial community require unification, consolidation
and reform of existing transportation laws.
164. 49 U.S.C. § 20(12) (1964).
